The Rise and Fall of Muslim Civil Society

1
Introduction
Various scholarly explanations have been set forth regarding why Islamic
reform, a movement preoccupied with reviving Islamic civilization and resist-
ing Western  colonialism  through  the  creation  of  a  Muslim  civil  society, was
superseded, in the mid-twentieth century, by Islamic fundamentalism, a move-
ment  preoccupied  with  creating an  ‘Islamic  state’  by  violence  if  necessary.1
Such explanations can be classified into two major categories: ‘traditional leg-
acy’, and ‘external dynamics’.
The ‘traditional legacy’ category includes works that explain Islamic funda-
mentalism as a product of the traditional legacy of Islam, which makes no sepa-
ration between religion and state and which promotes political violence through
the emphasis it places on jihad or morally ordained struggle/resistance.2 Mus-
lim religious scholars, however, strongly discouraged violent political descent.
Regarding the confrontation of government authority, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328)
wrote: “What is well known regarding the position of Sunni3 religious scholars
is that they do not sanction rebellions against rulers”, and “Sixty years under an
oppressive ruler is better than one night of anarchy.”4
It is also true that political violence frequents Islamic history. Moral legiti-
macy for such violence, however, was provided by religious scholars belonging
to heretical Muslim sects known for their militant character (e.g. al-Hashashin,
or the Assassins, etc.). Not only did Sunni religious scholars highly discourage
violence against  the government,  but they  also articulated a sophisticated and
complex approach  to the use of violence,  within the framework of jihad, that
barred targeting  children, women, religious figures (regardless  of the religion
they belonged to) and all those who are not directly engaged in the war effort
against Muslims. 5 Thus, to portray the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism
as an expression of Islam’s traditional legacy is to ignore centuries in which the
use of political violence was categorically rejected by Sunni religious scholars.
Recognizing the lack of a strong precedent within the Sunni traditional leg-
acy for  political violence, studies in the category of  ‘external dynamics’ have
Omar Imady
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presented Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction against “the growth of the na-
tion state and the peculiar problems of the twentieth century.”6 Factors such as
the failure of secular and/or national regimes to bring about economic prosper-
ity, Israel’s major victories in 1948 and 1967, and Iran’s ‘Islamic revolution’ are
usually emphasized by  such  studies. Clearly severe economic  conditions and
military defeats do tend to create an environment conducive to the rise of po-
liticized and often violent movements. There are numerous historical examples,
however, of  such conducive climates  that did not  give  birth to similar  move-
ments (e.g. post WWII Germany and Japan). Further, while it is clear that Iran’s
revolution fueled the enthusiasm for Islamic fundamentalism, it is equally clear
that fundamentalist institutions existed long before Iran’s revolution was even
contemplated by its leaders.
A more  accurate  explanation  of  the  rise  of Islamic  fundamentalism  can
be arrived at by focusing on  its  institutional  background,  that  is, the process
through which Western institutions were adopted by Muslim reformers during
the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. The adoption of the journal, the as-
sociation, the political party, and the paramilitary force by Muslim reformers,
as documented by subsequent chapters, reflected a frame of mind that regarded
institutions as non ideological objects which could be utilized by various types
of movements, irrespective of their principles and the setting within which they
were operating. It was only when the adopted institutions began to take on a life
of their own that Muslim reformers realized that certain institutions, (the politi-
cal party and the paramilitary force in particular) could not be appropriated to
their agenda. While the political party shifted the focus of the reform movement
from the  community to the state, the paramilitary force shifted its  focus from
colonial resistance to political violence. By then, however, it was too late. What
had been adopted from the West could no longer be returned.
Ironically, Islam had a similar institutional impact  on the West during the
Middle Ages. In The Rise of Colleges, George Makdisi argues that the scholarly
system of the West has its roots in Islamic soil.7 Europe’s adoption of the Mus-
lim ijazat al-tadris  (the license to  teach) during the  Middle Ages  irreversibly
undermined its hierarchal  system  of learning which was  previously  monopo-
lized by the Church. A horizontal scholarly system emerged which endowed the
European scholar not only with the license to teach, but also with ijazat al-ifta’,
or the license to profess an authoritative opinion, an act which was previously
the exclusive right of ‘the college of bishops in union with the pope’. Likewise,
the use of  the political party  and the paramilitary  force by Muslim reformers
irreversibly altered the way in which they understood their relationship to the
government and to the reform movement. In both cases, techniques belonging
to other cultures were treated as neutral and in both cases they undermined tra-
ditional perceptions and attitudes, and proved potentially explosive.8
This study aims at documenting  the link between  the rise of  Islamic fun-
damentalism and  a  process  of  institutional  change  which  was  carried  out  by
The Rise & Fall of Muslim Civil Society
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four Muslim reformers: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (d. 1935). The process,
which involved the relinquishing of the institutions of traditional Muslim com-
munity, i.e. madrasah (religious college), tariqah (religious order), and ta’ifah
(artisan/merchant guild), aimed at creating a Muslim civil society that could
both revive Islamic civilization and resist Western colonialism. The dichotomy
between Western institutional form and the moral vision of Islamic reform, to-
gether with a consistently hostile government, are shown to have been the prin-
cipal factors behind the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
The historical context for this study is found in ‘Part I’ where (a) an over-
view of the forerunner for Muslim civil society, i.e. the traditional Muslim com-
munity, is presented; and (b) the introduction of the institutions of civil society
by Jamal  al-Din al-Afghani to the religious  scholars of Egypt is documented.
‘Part II’ covers the  major  institutions of Muslim  civil society, i.e. the utiliza-
tion of the journal by Muslim reformers, the utilization of the association, the
utilization of the political party, and, finally, the utilization of the paramilitary
force. ‘Part III’ covers the fall of Muslim civil society by analyzing the primary
factors underlying the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.
Omar Imady